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Abstract. Trust is often conveyed through delegation, or through recommenda-
tion. This makes the trust authorities, who process and publish trust recommen-
dations, into an attractive target for attacks and spoofing. In some recent empiric
studies, this was shown to lead to a remarkable phenomenon of adverse selec-
tion: a greater percentage of unreliable or malicious web merchants were found
among those with certain types of trust certificates, then among those without.
While such findings can be attributed to a lack of diligence in trust authorities, or
even to conflicts of interest, our analysis of trust dynamics suggests that public
trust networks would probably remain vulnerable even if trust authorities were
perfectly diligent. The reason is that the process of trust building, if trust is not
breached too often, naturally leads to power-law distributions: the rich get richer,
the trusted attract more trust. The evolutionary processes with such distributions,
ubiquitous in nature, are known to be robust with respect to random failures, but
vulnerable to adaptive attacks. We recommend some ways to decrease the vul-
nerability of trust building, and suggest some ideas for exploration.
1 Introduction
Background. In analyzing security protocols, we often reason under the assumption
that a protocol participant, say Alice, is honest. This assumption simply means that
Alice acts just as prescribed by the protocol, and does not engage in any other avail-
able runs. Such an assumption is sometimes justified, and sometimes not. When this
assumption about Alice is made by another protocol participant, say Bob, then we say
that Bob trusts Alice. The notion of protocol, according to which Alice is trusted to
behave, is understood in the broadest sense of the word, as a general constraint on par-
ticipants’ behavior. E.g., a conversation protocol may consist of the requirement that
the participants speak the truth, and Bob may trust Alice in that sense. While Alice’s
statements may be true or false, Bob’s trust may go through many shades of gray, and
through some nuances of other colors. Trust is dynamic, and can be many-valued. But
note that it does not depend on any rules outside the specified protocol: e.g., a bank
robbery protocol may involve a requirement that the robbers do not shoot at each other,
so Bob may trust Alice in that sense. In any case, we write B Φ→
r
A, where Bob is the
trustor, Alice is the trustee, Φ is the entrusted protocol (constraint, property), and r is a
trust rating, which quantifies the level of trust.
In practice, this general notion of trust is usually restricted to some special cases:
⋆ Supported by ONR and EPSRC.
– in web commerce, the seller and the buyer are trusted to act according to the es-
tablished exchange protocols; more generally, trust plays an essential role in web
services and service-oriented architectures at large;
– in access control, various types of principals (people, machines, services, channels)
may entrust each other with various actions, or they may delegate authorities for
such actions to each other [2,17];
– in public key cryptography, it is useful to view keys as principals1, and to view the
key hierarchies as trust relationships [3,19,24,30],
– various peer-to-peer and business-to-business transactions are based on trust, and
the corresponding networks require various types of trust infrastructure [9,14,15,23].
When social relations need to be analyzed, the modeling techniques often proceed
from two different points of view: local and global. E.g. in economics, when the ques-
tions of risk and utility are analyzed from a local point of view, they subsume under
microeconomics; when they are analyzed from a global point of view, they fall under
macroeconomics. Analyses of trust fall into two roughly analogous categories.
Local analyses of the trust relationship B Φ→
v
A are largely concerned with the log-
ics of Φ, i.e. with the reasoning whereby the trustor B conveys or justifies entrusting
the trustee A with Φ. As explained above, the trust statements internalize principals’
beliefs and interactions, and vary through different forms of uncertainty, which lead to
nonstandard logical features and formalisms. The examples of this kind of approach
include [5,10,11,17,20,21]. E.g., when trust is analyzed in strand spaces [10], a trust re-
lationship B Φ→
v
A is viewed on the level of a single send-receive interaction, where A is
the sender and B the receiver. This interaction is annotated by a statement Φ, which the
receiver B requires, and the sender A guarantees. By sending the message, A asserts Φ;
when he receives the message, B assumes Φ. The statement that B trusts A thus means
that B relies on A for Φ.
On the other hand, the global analyses of trust usually look at the trust networks
spanned by the trust relationships B Φ→
v
A between the members A, B . . . of some set
of principals. While the local analyses focus on the logics of the entrusted properties
Φ, the global analyses focus on the network structure and traffic dynamics leading to
trust, and arising from it. The examples include [4,9,19,24,30]. In some cases [9], the
entrusted properties are left implicit, because all trust relationships of interest concern
the sameΦ (e.g.,Φ(A) = ”A is a reliable merchant” or ”A’s keys are not compromised”).
In other cases, the analyzed trust concerns boil down to two [3,19], or four [24] types
of trust relationship, which are simply annotated by different types of arrows. Although
the logics of trust have also been investigated in the context of trust networks [12,13],
many basic questions about trust dynamics remain widely open even when there is only
one entrusted property.
1 Statically, two principals knowing the same keys are indistinguishable by cryptographic
means. Dynamically, they may be distinguishable, e.g., by the fact that at some previous mo-
ment only one of them knew a particular key. Nevertheless, it is often useful and convenient to
treat the keys as first-class citizens of cryptographic protocols, and to distinguish the principals
only when necessary.
Summary of the paper. We analyze dynamics of trust networks. It is driven by the
users, who are trying to decide which web merchants to buy from, or in the Public Key
Infrastructure model, which keys to use. The security problem for the user is that a trust
authority, which she consults for trust recommendations, may be corrupt, just like any
merchant, or any key. In order to decide which merchants to trust, the user must decide
which recommenders to trust. And in order to decide which recommenders to trust, she
must try some of the recommended merchants. The problem of the chicken and the egg
arises. In order to protect herself, the user must not accept the trust recommendations
passively, but needs to build up her private trust vectors, perhaps using some public
recommendations on the way. While the public recommendations cover a broader range
of trust objects and interactions, private trust vectors are less likely to be corrupt.
In section 2, we present an abstract model of public trust networks. In section 3, we
analyze dynamics of the private trust building and updating. In section 4 we spell out
the conclusions. In section 5, we discuss the applications, and propose some ideas how
to combine private trust vectors with public recommendations, towards more reliable
trust decisions.
Trust networks, as presented in section 2, consist of two components, echoing the
distinction between the direct and indirect trust. This distinction is a common feature
of most of the trust network models encountered in the literature [3,19,24,30]. Enriched
with additional features, our model can be instantiated to these richer models. However,
in order to present a picture simple enough for our analyses, we also show how to ab-
sorb, in a matrix form of a trust network, the chains of indirect trust, which is conveyed
from one recommender to another, together with the direct trust, which is conveyed
from the recommenders to the shops.
In section 3, we show that, under reasonable assumptions, the process of trust build-
ing asymptotically converges to a power-law distribution of trust vectors. This means
that trust distributions have heavy tails of highly rated trust hubs. One consequence is
that trust distributions are thus resilient to random perturbations. Another consequence
is that they are vulnerable to adaptive attacks on their trust hubs. The proviso is that
the cheaters do not wait too long with their deceit. In our trust model, this proviso is
represented by the assumption that, the more trust a principal accumulates by acting
honestly, the less likely it becomes that he will turn out to be dishonest.
The conclusions are spelled out in section 4. Our analysis of trust dynamics applies
both to users’ private trust vectors, and to recommenders’ public recommendations.
Since the latter are open to attacks, and turn out to obey the vulnerable power law
distributions, they should not be directly used for trust decisions, but combined with the
private trust values. This suggestion is supported by the empiric evidence that the public
trust vectors are often actually subverted[8]. In section 5, we sketch some methods to
combine public and private trust vectors, that need to be explored and evaluated in future
research.
2 Modeling trust networks
In many communication networks, it is impossible, or unfeasible to fully authenticate
and authorize all interactions. Trust networks provide a supplementary service of par-
tial authentication or authorization. In many cases, authentication is bootstrapped by
incrementally strengthening trust.
We begin by an informal description of the conceptual components of a trust net-
work, and later provide the formal definitions. To determine thoughts, we first present
the special case of a web shopping scenario. A shopper visits a virtual network of web
merchants. If she has no prior experience with it, she can seek advice from some recom-
menders. Denote the set of merchants by J and the set of recommenders by U. The rec-
ommenders record and process the merchant ratings, submitted by the users after their
interactions with the merchants. From these ratings, the recommenders derive their rec-
ommendations, and publish them as trust certificates. A trust certificate c is represented
by an expression in the form u c→
r
i, where u ∈ U is a recommender, i ∈ J a mer-
chant, and r is the trust rating in a previously agreed rating scale R. A recommendation
network A is spanned by such certificates.
In addition to the merchant recommendation certificates u c→
r
i, a recommender
u may issue the endorsement certificates u e→
r
v, where v is another recommender.
The endorsement certificates span an endorsement network E. The endorsement chains,
represented by the paths through the endorsement network, allow analyzing the subtle
problems of transitivity of trust.
We call trust network a pair T = 〈A,E〉, whereA is a recommendation network, and
E is an endorsement network over the same set U of recommenders. Trust networks can
be presented in many slightly different ways, but they all model the public infrastructure
of trust.
Besides the shopping scenarios, trust networks also model the Public Key Infras-
tructures (PKI). In this interpretation, the trust authorities u ∈ U are not recommenders,
but simply keys. The endorsements u e→
r
v between them are now the delegation certifi-
cates. The objects of trust i ∈ J do not represent the web merchants any more, but the
bindings between some principals’ identities and their keys. A recommendation u c→
r
i
is now a binding certificate for i, signed by u. More details about this interpretation, and
about other presentations of trust networks, can be found in [3,19,24,30].
We proceed with the formal definitions.
2.1 Recommendation networks
A recommendation (certificate) network is an edge-labelled bipartite graph
A =
(
R boo B
〈∂,̺〉
// U × J)
where
– J is a set of objects,
– U is a set of trust authorities, or recommenders,
– B is a set of certificates, or recommendations, and
– R is a set of values, usually an ordered rig, where the trust ratings are evaluated.
A recommendation (certificate) u c→
r
i is thus represented by an edge c ∈ B of the
graph, with the source node ∂(c) = u and the target node ̺(c) = i. The value r = b(c)
is the trust rating assigned to i by u’s recommendation c. The same recommender u
may issue several recommendations c1, c2 . . . for the same object i, with the same or
different trust ratings; he may also revoke some of them. The use of these multiple
recommendations may be regulated by various policies, summing up or averaging the
ratings, validating only the last one, and so on. For simplicity, in the present paper
we assume that each trust authority takes care for this, and publishes at each point
in time at most one recommendation for each object, which sums up (or averages)
all its valid recommendations for that object. This allows us to conveniently reduce
recommendation networks to matrices A = (Aui)U×J, where
Aui =
∑
u
c→i
b(c)
The summation is taken in the rig structure of R. A rig R = (R,+, ·, 0, 1) is a ”ring
without the negatives”. This means that (R,+, 0) and (R, ·, 1) are commutative monoids2
satisfying a(b+ c) = ab+ ac and 0a = 0. The typical examples include natural numbers
N, non-negative reals R+, but also distributive lattices, which in general cannot be em-
bedded in a ring. For concreteness, we shall work mostly with R = N or R = R+, i.e.
assume that the trust ratings are nonnegative real numbers. It should be noted, however,
that in some concrete applications more general rigs are needed, e.g. of polynomials or
affine functions over R+.
On the other hand, if the idea that our trust ratings have no upper bound seems
strange, the reader can translate all our constructions to the interval R = [0, 1], with the
rating function β : B // [0, 1] set to
β(c) = 1 − 2−b(c)
The inverse transform is b(c) = − log2 (1 − β(c)). Being able to switch between these
two equivalent views is useful because each simplifies different aspects of rating: the
ratings over R+ are simpler when there are several parallel recommendations, which
we want to add up, whereas the ratings over [0, 1] are simpler when there is a chain of
recommendations, and we want to multiply them.
Remarks. While R+ and [0, 1] are just special cases of R, one could also raise the
opposite objection, that they are needlessly general, since most real systems accept and
generate their ratings over some very simple lattice (such as ⋆ < ⋆⋆ < ⋆⋆⋆). But data
analysis is never performed within that lattice. E.g., if the ratings are derived from users’
feedback, then they usually need to be balanced, before they are entered in the same data
set, because some users tend to rate more generously than others. In some other cases,
the ratings need to be normalized into a given interval. So the rig operations are usually
necessary. On the other hand, in relational data analysis, R is the boolean algebra {0, 1},
and the full ring structure is not given. So rigs are a reasonable compromise for general
explorations.
2 Rigs are sometimes called semirings. But it seems more reasonable to call semiring an algebra
R = (R,+, ·) where (R,+) and (R, ·) are semigroups, satisfying a(b + c) = ab + ac.
2.2 Endorsement networks
We model an endorsement network as an edge-labelled graph
E =
(
R doo D
〈∂,̺〉
// U × U)
where an endorsement (certificate) u e→
r
v is represented as element e ∈ D with ∂(e) = u
and ̺(e) = v. The trust rating r = d(c) this time quantifies u’s endorsement of v. Like
before, we reduce this network to a matrix E = (Euv)U×U, where
Euv =
∑
u
e→v
d(e)
Abstractly, an endorsement network is similar to some of the popular network mod-
els, used for analyzing protein interactions, the Web, social groups, etc. (Cf. [18,27],
and the references therein.) Its dynamics can always be analyzed in terms of promotion,
discussed in [28]. In that paper, path completions were introduced to allow analyzing
the multi-hop network interactions within a simple matrix framework. Here, they will
allow us to analyze chains of trust in a similar framework.
2.3 Path completions of endorsement networks
To some extent, trust is transitive: if u trusts w, and w trusts v, then u can accept some
reliance on v. But not too much. Depending on the level of risk, and the presence of al-
ternatives, u might prefer to avoid indirect trust. And in any case, it would be unwise for
her to rely upon someone removed from her by 20 trustees of trustees of trustees. . . Can
we capture such subtleties without complicating the model?
A chain or path u e→ v in an endorsement network E is a sequence of links u e1→
w1
e2→ w2 → · · ·
en→ v. Given an endorsement network E, we would like to define
another such network E# over the same set of recommenders, but with the chains of
the endorsement certificates as the new endorsement certificates. The naive idea is to
simply take all finite chains of network links as the new network links; i.e., the paths
through the old network become the links of the new network. The new network is then
closed under composition: each path from u to v, as a composite of some links through
other nodes, corresponds to a link from u to v. This amounts to generating the free
category over the network graph.
Unfortunately, besides the trust dissipation, described above, this kind of closure
destroys a lot essential information in all networks, just like the transitive closure of
a relation does. E.g., in a social network, a friend of a friend is often not even an ac-
quaintance. Taking the transitive closure of the friendship relation obliterates that fact.
Moreover, the popular ”small world” phenomenon suggests that almost every two peo-
ple can be related through no more than six friends of friends of friends. . . So already
adding all paths of length six to a social network, with a symmetric friendship relation,
is likely to generate a complete graph. In fact, the average probability that two of node’s
neighbors in an undirected graph are also linked with each other is an important factor,
called clustering coefficient [32]. On the other hand, in some networks, e.g. of protein
interactions, a link u → v which shortcuts the links u → w → v often denotes a direct
feed-forward connection, rather than a composition of the two links, and leads to essen-
tially different dynamics. For all these reasons, only some ”short” paths can be added
to a network. This is assured by penalizing the compositions.
As mentioned above, the ratings within R = [0, 1] are more convenient for analyzing
the chains of trust, so we use it in the next couple of definitions.
Definition 1. For a given endorsement network E = ([0, 1] δoo D ∂ //
̺
// U), a trust
threshold η ∈ [0, 1], and a composition penalty ǫ ∈ [0, 1], we define the path completion
to be the network
E# =
([0, 1] δoo D# ∂ //
̺
// U) where
D# = {e ∈ D+ | δ(e) ≥ η} and
δ
(
u0
e1→ u1
e2→ u2 → · · ·
en→ un
)
= ǫn−1
n∏
k=1
δ(ek)
with D+ denoting the set of all nonempty paths in E, i.e. n ≥ 1.
Remark. A path-complete network E# is closed under the compositions of high-trust
endorsements, but not under the compositions which fall below the trust threshold. It is
not hard to see that the path completion is an idempotent operation, i.e. E## = E#, but
that it may fail to be a proper closure operation, because the endorsements e ∈ E such
that δ(e) < η are not in E#, so that generally E * E#.
2.4 Completions of trust networks
At the final step of completing a trust network, we bring the information captured in it
into a more manageable form by folding the completion of the endorsement part into
a new recommendation network. The trust matrix, extracted from this recommendation
network in the same way as before, now captures not only the direct recommendations,
but also a relevant part of indirect trust.
Definition 2. Suppose that we are given a trust network T = 〈A,E〉 with
A =
([0, 1] βoo B 〈∂,̺〉 // U × J)
E =
([0, 1] δoo D 〈∂,̺〉 // U × U)
and moreover a trust threshold η ∈ [0, 1], and a composition penalty ǫ ∈ [0, 1]. The
endorsement completion of T is the recommendation network
A
#
=
([0, 1] βoo B# 〈∂,̺〉 // U × J) where
B#ui =
{〈e, c〉 ∈ ∑
v∈U
D∗uv × Bvi | β(e, c) ≥ η} and
β
(
u
e→ v c→ i) = δ(e) · β(c)
where D∗uv denotes the set of all paths in from u to v in E, including the empty path ø if
u = v, in which case δ(ø) = 1.
Assumption. In the rest of the paper, we work with recommendation networksA = A#,
assumed to be endorsement complete.
In the next section we analyze how individual users build their own trust vectors.
The repercussions of this analysis to public trust networks are discussed in section 5.
3 Privatetrust
For intuition, we introduce the mathematical model of the process of trust building and
updating in terms of an imaginary shopper trying out some web merchants. The model
is, however, completely general, and we explain later that a recommender also builds
his trust vector by an analogous process.
3.1 Private trust vectors and their updating
The shopper records her trust in a trust vector τ ∈ RJ. As the time t = 0, 1, 2, . . .
ticks, the shopper interacts with the shops, and subsequently updates τ according to her
shopping experiences. This evolution makes the trust vector into a stochastic process
τ : N // D(RJ), which expresses the likely distribution of shopper’s trust at time
t as the random variable τ(t) ∈ D(RJ). The stationary distribution of the stochastic
process τ is the likely distribution of trust, which we would like to analyze.
On the side of the recommenders, the shopper may also maintain a trust vector σ ∈
RU. The idea that a trusted recommender recommends reliable merchants is expressed
through the invariant τi =
∑
u∈U σuAui, which should be maintained as τ is updated. This
makes σ : N // D(RU) into another stochastic process.
Initially, at t = 0, the shopper may assign all merchants the same trust rating τi(0) =
1; or she may assign each recommender the same trust rating σu(1) = 1, and derive
τi(0) = ∑u∈U Aui.
The stochastic process X : N // DJ represents shopper’s shopping history. Each
random variable X(t) ∈ DJ selects the merchant with whom the shopper interacts at
time t. We assume that X(0) is distributed uniformly at random, whereas the probability
that the next shop X(t + 1) will be i ∈ J is either proportional to the trust τi(t), or it
is a fixed value α ∈ [0, 1], if i has had a minimal trust rating, and selecting it means
replacing it by a new, untested shop. Formally,
Prob
(
X(t + 1) = i
)
=

α if τi(t) was minimal (so i is now new)
C(t)τi(t) otherwise
(1)
where C(t) = 1−α∑
i∈J τi(t) is the normalization factor. The minimality of τi(t) means that for
all j ∈ J holds τi(t) ≤ τ j(t). The α-case corresponds to shopper’s habit to, every once in
a while replace an untrusted shop, with a minimal rating, with a new, untested shop.
After the transaction with the merchant X(t+1), the shopper updates her trust vector
τ(t) to τ(t + 1), depending on whether the merchant acted honestly or not:
τi(t + 1) =

τi(t) if i , X(t + 1)
0 if i = X(t + 1) is dishonest
1 if i = X(t + 1) is honest, and new (i.e., τi(t) was minimal)
1 + τi(t) if i = X(t + 1) is honest, not new (i.e.,τi(t) not minimal)
The interpretation of the third case is that the label i = X(t+ 1) is reassigned from some
untrusted merchant, which had a minimal trust rating τi(t), to a new merchant, whose
initial trust rating is set to 1 if the initial transaction with was satisfactory. In the fourth
case, the merchant i = X(t + 1) was tried out before, and has accumulated a trust rating
τX(t+1), which is now increased to τX(t+1)(t + 1) = 1 + τX(t+1)(t) because of a satisfactory
transaction.
3.2 Private trust distribution
If the trust ratings evolve according to the process just described, how will they, in the
long run, partition the set J of merchants? How many merchants will there be with a
trust rating of 1, how many with a trust rating of 2, and so on? More precisely, we want
to estimate the likely number of elements in each of the sets Wℓ(t) = {i ∈ J | τi(t) = ℓ},
for ℓ ∈ R, as the time t ticks ahead. So we set up a system of equations, describing the
evolution of
wℓ(t) = |{i ∈ J | τi(t) = ℓ}|
where |Y| denotes the number of elements of the set Y. Note that the disjoint union is
∪ℓ∈RWℓ(t) = J, and therefore ∑ℓ∈R wℓ(t) = J, where we write J = |J|.
The initial values wℓ(0) are determined by shopper’s choice of τ(0). If she sets
τi(0) = 1 for all i ∈ J, then w1(0) = J.
How does w1 change at the time t? We claim that
w1(t + 1) − w1(t) = J · Prob(X(t + 1) = i | τi minimal) · γ⊥
− w1(t) · Prob(X(t + 1) = i | τi(t) = 1)
= Jαγ⊥ − w1(t) ·C(t)
To justify this, note that the difference between W1(t + 1) and W1(t) comes about for
one of the two reasons:
– either i ∈ J is added to W1(t), because τi(t) was minimal, and X(t + 1) = i was
selected, with the probability α to be replaced with a new shop from J; and then
that new shop, now called i, provided an honest transaction, the probability of which
is γ⊥; so i is now assigned the trust rating τi(t + 1) = 1;
– or i ∈ J is deleted from W1(t), because τi(t) was 1, and X(t + 1) = i was selected
from W1(t), with the probability C(t) · τi(t); after the transaction, i’s trust rating was
updated either to τi(t + 1) = 2 or to τi(t + 1) = 0, depending on whether he acted
honestly or dishonestly; but i was deleted from W1(t) in any case.
However, when the ratings ℓ > 1 are updated, it will not be irrelevant whether i acts
honestly or dishonestly. To describe dynamics of this process, we denote by γℓ ∈ [0, 1]
the probability that a shop with a rating ℓ is honest. With the described process of trust
updating, accumulating a high trust rating ℓ takes time. In order to get a high trust rating,
a dishonest shop has to act honestly for a long time. It is therefore reasonable to assume
that the probability 1−γℓ that an ℓ-rated shop is dishonest decreases to 0 as ℓ increases;
i.e. that limℓ→∞ γℓ = 1.
Rating dynamics is now
wℓ(t + 1) − wℓ(t) = wℓ−1(t) · Prob(X(t + 1) = i | τi(t) = ℓ − 1) · γℓ−1
−wℓ(t) · Prob(X(t + 1) = i | τi(t) = ℓ)
= wℓ−1(t) ·C(t) · (ℓ − 1) · γℓ−1 − wℓ(t) ·C(t) · ℓ
The difference between Wℓ(t + 1) and Wℓ(t) again comes from two sources:
– either i ∈ J is added to Wℓ(t), because τi(t) was ℓ − 1 and X(t + 1) = i was selected
from Wℓ−1(t) with the probability C(t) · (ℓ − 1); and then this i turned out to be
honest, with the probability γℓ−1, so that τi(t + 1) got updated to 1 + τi(t) = ℓ;
– or i ∈ J is deleted from Wℓ(t), because τi(t) was ℓ, and X(t + 1) = i was selected
from Wℓ(t), with probability C(t) · ℓ; if i acted honestly, his trust rating got updated
to ℓ + 1; if he acted dishonestly, it got updated to 0; in any case, he got removed
from Wℓ(t).
Conceptually, the above derivations follow Simon’s master equation method [31]. To
simplify the solution, we use a more contemporary approach of [6,33]. First of all, we
do not seek the solutions for the sizes wℓ(t) of the sets Wℓ(t), but rather for the densities
vℓ(t) = wℓ(t)J . Since
∑
ℓ∈R vℓ(t) = 1, for every t, the functions v(−)(t) : R // [0, 1]
are probability distributions with a finite support. Together, they thus form a stochastic
process v : N // DR, described by the difference equations
∆v1(t) = αγ⊥ −C(t)v1(t)
∆vℓ(t) = γℓ−1(ℓ − 1)C(t)vℓ−1(t) − ℓC(t)vℓ(t)
As shown in the Appendix, the steady state of this process turns out to be
υ1 =
αγ⊥
c + 1
υn =
αγ⊥Gn−1
c
B
(
n, 1 + 1
c
)
where Gn =
∏n
ℓ=1 γℓ, the constant c satisfies ct ≈ C(t) = 1−α∑i∈J τi(t) , and B is Dirichlet’s
Beta function. But Stirling’s formula implies that B(x, y) ≈ x−y holds as x → ∞. We
have thus proven that, with a sufficiently fine trust rating scale, and with the probability
of honesty γℓ increasing with the trust rating ℓ fast enough, the trust ratings obey the
power law [25,26].
In summary, we have proven the following:
Theorem. A trustor maintains trust ratings for a set of J trustees. The ratings take their
values from a sufficiently large set, so that they can strictly increase whenever justified.
They are updated according to the following procedure:
– Initially, the tustor assigns some fixed ratings (e.g., equal) to all trustees.
– Then the trustor repeatedly tests the trustees:
• with a probability α, she tests an untested trustee, adds it to the set J, and
deletes from it a trustee with the minimal rating;
• otherwise, the turstor tests a previously tested trustee, with a probability pro-
portional to its trust rating.
– After each step, the trustor updates the trust rating ℓ of the tested trustee as follows
• with a probability γℓ, she increases it (because of a satisfactory outcome of the
test);
• otherwise, she sets it to zero.
If the probability γℓ of a satisfactory transaction with an ℓ-rated trustee increases fast
enough enough to satisfy 1
esℓ
≤ γℓ ≤ 1 for some convergent series ∑∞ℓ=1 sℓ < ∞, so that
G =
∏∞
ℓ=1 γℓ > 0, then in the long run, the number wn of trustees with the trust rating n
obeys the power law
wn ≈
αγ⊥GJ
c
n−(1+ 1c )
where c is a renormalising constant c ≈ 1−α1+αγ⊥ , and γ⊥ is the probability that an untested
trustee will satisfy the test.
Remarks. As explained in section 2.1, the assumption that the trust can always increase
does not mean that the trust ratings have to be unbounded: they can also increase asymp-
totically. This assumption is only needed to assure that the process of trust building will
not become irrelevant after some threshold is reached. In reality, of course, only finitely
many interactions with finitely many shops can be taken into account, but there is a real
sense in which the trust process can always be refined, and trust increased.
The assumption that G =
∏∞
ℓ=1 γℓ > 0 means that the probability 1 − γℓ, that a shop
with a trust rating ℓ is not trustworthy, quickly decreases as ℓ increases. This assumption
is not satisfied if many untrustworthy shops act honestly for a long time, waiting to
accumulate trust, and then strike. If there are incentives for that, the heavy tail of the
power component of wn is trimmed by the exponential component Gn =
∏n
ℓ=1 γℓ, and
the distribution of trust is exponential.
But this leads to a negative feedback: as they decrease the range of trust distribution,
the dishonest trust hubs actually decrease the vulnerability of the network. The more
persistent attackers there are, the higher the cost of an attack.
Other interpretations. Although our model was described and motivated as shopper’s
trust process, it seems likely that the stochastic process governing recommender’s trust
vector would be of the same type. The main difference is, of course, that the recom-
mender does not select and test the merchant himself, but builds his trust vector from
the merchant ratings that he obtains as the feedback from the shoppers. However, a
shopper who comes back to submit the feedback is probably the same one who pre-
viously came to obtain recommender’s recommendation. And it is furthermore just as
likely that the shopper has selected the merchant following that recommendation. So
the selection of the merchant whose trust rating will be updated at a time t + 1 was
guided by recommender’s trust vector at time t, just as it was the case with shopper’s
trust dynamics.
3.3 Robustness and vulnerability of private trust
The upshot of the Theorem just proved is that there is a great variety of trust ratings:
the distribution has a heavy tail. Money attracts money, and trust attracts more trust.
As you extend the circle of merchants and the rating scale, you will find merchants
with higher and higher trust rating. This applies to user’s private trust vectors τ and
σ, as well as to recommender’s public trust vectors, displayed as the rows of the rec-
ommendation matrix A = (Aui)U×J. Moreover, although we did not describe dynamics
of an endorsement network here, it seems certain that it also leads to a distribution of
recommenders’ influence, obeying the power law. The reason is that the endorsement
dynamics is quite similar to promotion dynamics, described in [28], which is a version
of one of the processes studied in Simon’s seminal paper about the power law [31].
The structure and the properties of the distributions that obey the power law have
been extensively analyzed [25,26,27]. As mentioned in the Introduction, because of the
presence of highly rated hubs, such distributions tend to be robust under random per-
turbations, but vulnerable to adaptive attacks on their hubs3. Leaving the mathematical
details aside, the security consequence is that the power law distributions work for the
attacker: he only needs to attack a small number of nodes of high ranking, in order
to gain control over a large part of the system. This phenomenon has been previously
demonstrated on toy models of trust networks, involving the bottleneck nodes [19]. Al-
though the recommender networks, currently deployed on the Web, still do not form
a large network, the same phenomenon — that the main trust hubs become increas-
ingly unreliable — has also been observed in practice: e.g., [8] describes some extreme
examples.
4 Conclusions
The obvious security lessons, arising from our analyses, and supported by the empiric
observations are thus:
– Trust decisions should not be derived from public trust recommendations alone.
They should be based on private trust vectors, that the user should maintain herself.
– Public trust recommendations should be used to supplement and refine private trust.
3 One way to make this statement precise is to build a random graph with the given trust distribu-
tion as the degree distribution. The methods of [1] can serve for this purpose. The edges of the
obtained graph can be interpreted as the interactions recorded in nodes’ trust ratings. The trust
hubs would then be the graph hubs in the usual sense: highly connected nodes. The robustness
would manifest itself as a high phase transition: the graph remains connected even when many
randomly selected edges are eliminated; and the fragility would mean that the graph falls apart
very easily if some of the hubs are removed.
5 Towards applications:
Combining private trust and public recommendations
Hoping that the gentle reader will not be too disturbed by the fact that the paper con-
tinues beyond its conclusions4, in this final section we sketch some ways to implement
these conclusions. We propose for further exploration two methods for a user of a trust
network to combine her private trust vectors with some public recommendations, in or-
der to obtain more informative trust guidance. Although we attempt to provide intuitive
explanations, understanding the technical details of these condensed ideas may require
some familiarity with LSI and with the vector model.
5.1 Trust communities
It is often emphasized that trust is relative to a community, or more generally to a
module [28] within a network: e.g., a criminal may be trusted within the community
of criminals, but not within a community of security researchers, and vice versa. The
members of the same community can be recognized by similar trust vectors, or recom-
mendations.
In this section, we briefly summarize how a recommendation matrix can be used to
recognize communities in the space of recommenders on one hand, and in the space of
merchants on the other. The merchants which deserve to be trusted for the same type of
services are likely to be highly recommended by the same recommenders. This groups
them into communities. The user can refine his trust by computing how much he trusts
each community, and how is his trust distributed within each of them. While the public
trust recommendations may be unreliable, and better not followed directly, they pro-
vide reliable and valuable information about the trust communities. By relativizing the
private trust over the trust communities, the user can obtain significantly more precise
guidance, distinguishing between the various forms of trust in the various communities,
even in the model where the entrusted properties are kept implicit.
By suitably renormalizing the data, the similarity between the trust vectors ϕ and
ψ ∈ RJ can be viewed as the angle between the induced recommender vectors
s(ϕ, ψ) = 〈Aϕ | Aψ〉
where 〈x|y〉 = ∑v∈U xv ·yv is the inner product in the space RU. The angle is often used as
the similarity measure in information retrieval and data mining [22]. It should be noted
that it leads to subtle statistical problems, if applied to diverse samples [29]. The trust
communities, as the subspaces of similar vectors within RJ, can be detected by spectral
methods, using the data mining technique of Latent Semantic Indexing (LSI) [7,16,29].
The idea is to look for the vectors ξ where s(ξ, ξ) attains the extremal values. Since the
transpose AT satisfies 〈Aϕ | Aψ〉 = 〈ϕ | AT Aψ〉, the similarity can be also be expressed as
s(ϕ, ψ) = 〈ϕ | AT Aψ〉. The extremal values of s(ξ, ξ) = 〈ξ | AT Aξ〉 can thus be found as
the eigenvalues {λ1 > λ2 > · · · > λm} of AT A. The communities are the corresponding
eigenspaces, described by the projectors {P1, . . . , Pm}.
4 A reviewer of a version of this paper where the above conclusions were not separated in their
own section, objected that the paper ended abruptly, without any conclusions.
There are at least two ways to refine private trust τ using the trust communities
{P1, . . . , Pm}.
Community specific private trust. Instead of using his trust vector τ ∈ RJ to select
the trusted objects, the user can compute the community specific trust vectors
τk = Pkτ
obtained by projecting τ into each of the eigenspaces Pk, k = 1, . . . ,m, i.e. by relativiz-
ing it to the dominant merchant communities. In this way, even if the trust relations
A → B are not explicitly annotated by the entrusted properties Φ, the user can refine
his trust decisions by recognizing the ”latent” entrusted properties, uncovered as the
dominant trust communities {P1, . . . , Pm}.
Personalized recommendation matrix. Intuitively, the spectrum {λ1 > λ2 > · · · > λm}
expresses a notion of cohesion, i.e. the strength of the mutual trust within each of the
communities {P1, P2, . . . , Pm}. On the other hand, the degree to which a user with a trust
vector τ trusts a community Pk can be measured by the similarity s(τ, τk) = 〈τ | Pkτ〉.
The Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) theorem tells that the spectral decom-
position AT A =
∑m
k=1 λkPk induces A =
∑m
k=1
√
λkΠk, for the suitable operators Πk.
The personalized recommendation matrix, remixed according to the community trust θ
induced by user’s trust vector τ is then Aτ =
∑m
k=1
√〈τ|Pkτ〉Πk. Using this private ma-
trix is equivalent to using the community specific trust vectors, within each of the trust
communities; but it also allows evaluating trust for combinations of communities.
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Appendix: The steady state of the trust process
The trust process v : N // DR is described by the difference equations
∆v1(t) = αγ⊥ −C(t)v1(t)
∆vℓ(t) = γℓ−1(ℓ − 1)C(t)vℓ−1(t) −C(t)ℓvℓ(t)
Recall, first of all, from section 3.1 that C(t) = 1−αS (t) , where S (t) =
∑
i∈J τi(t). The dy-
namics of τ, described at the end of section 3.1, implies that
S (t + 1) =
∑
i,X(t+1)
τi(t) + γX(t+1) (1 + τX(t+1)(t)) + αγ⊥
where γ⊥ is the probability that a shopper is satisfied after an interaction with a new
shop. It follows that
∆S (t) = γX(t+1) − (1 − γX(t+1))τX(t+1)(t) + αγ⊥ ≈ 1 + αγ⊥
is approximately constant and thus S (t) ≈ (1+αγ⊥)t. Hence C(t) ≈ ct , where c = 1−α1+αγ⊥ .
With this simplification, and with the martingale assumption of [33] satisfied, the
solutions of the above system of difference equations can be approximated by the solu-
tions of the corresponding differential system
dv1
dt = αγ⊥ −
c
t
v1
dvℓ
dt =
γℓ−1c(ℓ − 1)vℓ−1 − cℓvℓ
t
where the discrete time variable t has been made continuous. The steady state of the
stochastic process v : R // DR can now be found in the form vℓ(t) = t · υℓ, by
expanding the recurrence
υ1 = αγ⊥ − cυ1
υℓ = γℓ−1c(ℓ − 1)υℓ−1 − cℓυℓ
into
υ1 =
αγ⊥
c + 1
υℓ =
(ℓ − 1)γℓ−1c
ℓc + 1
υℓ−1
which further gives
υ2 =
αγ⊥
c + 1
· γ1c
2c + 1
υ3 =
αγ⊥
c + 1
· γ1c
2c + 1
· 2γ2c3c + 1
. . .
υn = αγ⊥

n−1∏
ℓ=1
γℓ
 cn−1 · (n − 1)!∏n
k=1(kc + 1)
=
αγ⊥Gn−1
c
· (n − 1)!∏n
k=1
(
k + 1
c
)
=
αγ⊥Gn−1
c
·
Γ(n)Γ
(
1 + 1
c
)
Γ
(
n + 1 + 1
c
)
=
αγ⊥Gn−1
c
· B
(
n, 1 + 1
c
)
